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Tit for tat in heterogeneous populations
scientific article published in Nature
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instance of
scholarly article
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title
Tit for tat in heterogeneous populations
(English)
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author
Karl Sigmund
series ordinal
2
object named as
Karl Sigmund
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Martin A. Nowak
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1
object named as
Martin A. Nowak
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language of work or name
English
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publication date
January 1992
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published in
Nature
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volume
355
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issue
6357
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page(s)
250-253
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exact match
https://scigraph.springernature.com/pub.10.1038/355250a0
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cites work
The evolution of cooperation
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https://api.crossref.org/works/10.1038%2F355250A0
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7 January 2021
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The further evolution of cooperation
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reference URL
https://api.crossref.org/works/10.1038%2F355250A0
retrieved
7 January 2021
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No pure strategy is evolutionarily stable in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game
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reference URL
https://api.crossref.org/works/10.1038%2F355250A0
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7 January 2021
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More evolution of cooperation
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https://api.crossref.org/works/10.1038%2F355250A0
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7 January 2021
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TIT FOR TAT in sticklebacks and the evolution of cooperation
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https://api.crossref.org/works/10.1038%2F355250A0
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7 January 2021
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Reciprocal food sharing in the vampire bat
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https://api.crossref.org/works/10.1038%2F355250A0
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7 January 2021
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Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
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https://api.crossref.org/works/10.1038%2F355250A0
retrieved
7 January 2021
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Mistakes allow evolutionary stability in the repeated prisoner's dilemma game
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Crossref
reference URL
https://api.crossref.org/works/10.1038%2F355250A0
retrieved
7 January 2021
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Oscillations in the evolution of reciprocity.
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https://api.crossref.org/works/10.1038%2F355250A0
retrieved
7 January 2021
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Identifiers
DOI
10.1038/355250A0
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Dimensions Publication ID
1040050895
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ResearchGate publication ID
243657567
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